I. Introduction
The use of eye-witness accounts to establish institutional details is common practice in many disciplines of the social sciences. While Adam Smith claims to draw on his experience of having visited a pin factory to describe the benefits of the division of labour, much of the discipline of economics has been beholden to the deductivist research methodology, which places little emphasis on the gathering and analysis of empirical data in the formulation of economic theories. However, there is a long history of inductivist economics, especially in continental Europe. Moreover, leading economists in the US have recently stepped up their efforts to engage in fieldwork. 2 In area studies, where country-specific features need to be explored, the concept of field work is naturally far more widespread, such as in the context of an examination of Japanese economic institutions. Examples for the use of interviews in research on the Japanese economy include the interview with Miyohei Shinohara in Amsden (2001) , or the extensive use of interviews to establish details of monetary policy implementation during the 1980s and early 1990s in Werner (1999 Werner ( , 2002 Werner ( , 2003 . The present paper adds to this growing strand of literature by contributing a frank interview with a former senior Japanese central bank official.
The use of eye-witness accounts is particularly pertinent in an examination of the actual conduct of central banks, since this type of institution has traditionally been prone to emphasizing secrecy. Moreover, the number of central bankers or former central bankers who have personal experience in central bank operations (as opposed to working as economists in their research departments) and who are willing to talk candidly on the record about the inner workings of central banks remains limited.
Mr Ishii has published extensively on the Bank of Japan, such as in Ishii (1996 Ishii ( , 1998 Ishii ( , 2001 ). However, these books have not been translated into English. Moreover, his books cover a wide array of issues related to the Bank of Japan, while the purpose of this interview is to contribute towards a better understanding of specific aspects of the internal management of the Bank of Japan, namely its personnel management policies and its information management policies. To preserve the authenticity of the original interview and the words used, colloquial expressions used by Mr Ishii during the interview were largely left in their original form. At the end, some of the findings are commented and used as guidance for the direction of future research. The interview took place on 19 March 2003 and 26 March 2003, covering far more ground than could be covered in this abridged interview paper. However, it was published in unabridged form as Ishii and Werner (2003) in Japanese. Rosemary Cooke kindly provided the translation into English. 5 3 This was the first time for the author to interview this particular central banker. None of the interviews used by Werner, such as Werner (1999 Werner ( , 2002 Werner ( , 2003a , had included Mr Ishii. His testimony is therefore that of an additional independent witness. 4 David Ibison, Rift opens over Bank of Japan frontrunner, Financial Times, 22/23 February 2003, page 1. The article, largely consisting of quotes from Mr Ishii, starts with the following paragraph: "The leading candidate to become the new governor of the Bank of Japan has been openly criticized over his record as a monetary policymaker, in a letter sent to politicians from a former senior central bank official." 5 This paper follows the conventions of the English language and hence places family names after first names.
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going too far to say that BoJ top executives exert control over all personnel right down to the new hires.
Of course, Sasaki was also formerly deputy director of Personnel. From very early on in his own career, pretty much from the beginning, he was called the [future] governor. And it was Ichimada who chose him for the top job. The latter was called "Pope Ichimada" and was more important than the Minister of Finance. I think it was him who started the BoJ 'princes' system. ….
The role of BoJ governor is just like being a king or shogun. Just as an heir to the shogunate would be chosen, the BoJ governorship was always predetermined. When the time came, the BoJ Princes would receive the 'scroll' 6 from the elder Princes -a kind of confirmation that they could become future governor -and when this is presented, the details of governorship,…the full story [with the details of monetary policy], are passed on. The handing over of the scroll is in effect like saying, "You will be king". And just as you say, this initiation process starts early.
Those who don't have the scroll do not understand the true financial policies. In fact, [like external BoJ governors] former governor Hayami didn't have the scroll either. …. The BoJ's true tool of circulating money is controlled by the Banking Department (eigyou kyoku).
7 That's why from early on, I expressed my desire to work there. On joining the BoJ, the first year is spent at head office, after which one is assigned to a branch for two years. I told my branch chief that when it was time to go back to head office, I would resign if I couldn't work in the Banking Department. The branch chief negotiated heavily on my behalf and I was eventually assigned to the Banking Department as I had wished. It was a tough selection process where only 3 out of 30 people could return into the Banking Department. 8 What's more, for the same period I was the only one to go straight into the Banking Department in charge of 'window guidance'.
At the time, former deputy governor [Yutaka] Yamaguchi was in charge. He was then the number one in charge of the Banking Department's Planning and Coordination Division. There were five members of staff, two of whom later became executive directors. In other words, the section accumulated candidates for future directorships. The section chief, of course, was a candidate for the post of deputy governor and governor. Deputy Yamaguchi
The Japanese Economy, vol. 30, no. 6, Nov-Dec 2002 What's more, Mr Fukui should at the same time have referred to the Mizuho Bank system failure that caused a huge mess-up, the managerial responsibilities of the top executive in charge of the system, and the distinction between himself and the Fukui who formerly held the important job of deputy governor of the BoJ.
On 'information management' in general
Werner: Mr Fukui is praised for being very adept at dealing with -some would say influencing -journalists and the media.
Ishii: You could call it 'information management'. The Bank of Japan is well-versed in information management, although the management of information is inherently wrong. A transparent central bank must make its information public. I think it's abnormal: The BoJ spends money and even puts pressure on foreign universities. It invites almost all the top foreign [academic] economists to conferences and such events in Japan, but in doing so it is handing over a lot of money, so those academics listen to what the BoJ says.
In the world what counts is money.
Even if you, Mr Werner, were to attend such a conference in order to ask the professors their own opinion, if the BoJ has given instructions beforehand, it is also possible that they just won't accept questions from critics of the BoJ. Again, it is a possibility that if you wish 12 Literally, a 'suckfish' or 'remora' (koban zame in Japanese, the name of a parasitic type of fish, with the double meaning that 'koban' also refers to the pre-Meiji era coins). According to The American Heritage ® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, 2000, a 'remora' is "Any of several marine fishes of the family Echeneidae, having on the head a sucking disk with which they attach themselves to sharks, whales, sea turtles, or the hulls of ships. Also called shark sucker, suckerfish, suckfish. Etymology: Latin, delay (from the belief that they could slow ships down)", from remorare, to delay : re + morare, to delay (from mora, delay)."
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Let me explain in more concrete terms. Say there's an official based in London -the manager of the London branch [of the Bank of Japan] perhaps -and he sees the name 'Werner' on the list of attendees of a conference to be held in London, he may hunt down the conference chairman or whoever and the day before the conference takes him out to lunch and works on him so that he won't allow Mr Werner to say too much. Of course, this kind of interference does occur. Whether it should occur or not is another question, but currently it is par for the course. To be effective in this kind of role is the job of the London representative [of the Bank of Japan]. Now most people will no doubt think this not to be the case, but although the official should be there to investigate, research and analyse the European economy and financial policy, in fact information management is the more important role. And if he fails at this, he will lose his job.
Here Werner: That's because he was responsible for information management but he did not manipulate the information as the 'Princes' desired?
Ishii:
Precisely. This information includes policy information, financial information and undisclosed internal information. The style of information management is completely unchanged from that of the Meiji era. In other words, it's the same method of management as that of the staff officer in the former Imperial Army. For the Japanese elite, the management methods of the staff officer are very useful; they have grown accustomed to this system and followed in the same footsteps.
When you are young, personnel transfers mean that you get to experience a number of different departments, but in time, you begin to be categorized and are nurtured into becoming a specialist. After working in the International Department for my first year, I later spent 3 years in the Banking Department, and a further 3 years back in the International Department. As domestic and foreign finance were not separated yet I was taught both. Now, the Financial Markets Department -which merged with the Banking Department and the International Department -is in charge of both, so rankings have changed a little, but the general idea is the same.
Werner: When anyone from outside the BoJ, such as the general public, academics analyzing the BoJ and the media, requests an interview or data, more often than not they are introduced to the economists in the Institute of Monetary Research and the Research & Statistics Department. So the real role of these economists is to act as an enquiry desk?
These two departments also produce a lot of published material such as their monthly and quarterly reports. Of course, the publications reflect the opinions of the economists, but even so these are BoJ publications. So, most outsiders end up equating these two departments with the BoJ. But if those two departments do not have a grasp on the real BoJ monetary policy information, then that's somewhat disturbing, isn't it? It's not just the economists themselves that are being misled, but the public, the critics, the academics and the media too. We are being made to think that what the economists say and print is the view of the BoJ as a whole, but if this does not reflect actual monetary policy then it's a serious issue. Naturally, here, too, the BoJ imitated Germany. They studied the German [military] 'staff' structure and the policy staff, and introduced it to the BoJ. Of course, the next place to create a research department after the BoJ was in the army. The Japanese Imperial Army's information research department originated from the BoJ. The Manchurian Railway Research Department is pretty famous, but that too found its form from the BoJ.
During the post-war era, every bank set up its own research department. Before long there were get-togethers of research department heads -the chairman of which was always the head of the BoJ Research Department. The BoJ Research Department chief was the leader of all [commercial] bank research departments.
The BoJ Research Department came into being under the direct control of the governor, with the objective of researching the economic situation and financial systems of other countries and creating data with which the governor could decide on new policies.
The first person to become well known in the BoJ Research Department was Toshihiko Yoshino: he was the first [post-war] Japanese 'economist'. He was a Marxist economist. …. Mr Yoshino put his heart and soul into the Research Department, and was the director of the department when I joined the BoJ. He had good results as head of the department, and after the war he was from first to last the right-hand man of [governor] Ichimada. Yoshino took charge of all Ichimada's research.
The next member of the Research Department elite to follow Yoshino was current Liberal Party member Yoshio Suzuki. Actually, at that time there was a fine man called Bunji Kure, but after he criticised governor Sasaki he was forced to retire. It was all over when he advised Sasaki that his policies were flawed. At the BoJ it is unforgivable for the Research Department chief to resist the governor. When Kure advised the governor, "The proposal about 'Remodelling the Japanese Archipelago' is flawed. Mr Sasaki, if we continue along this path, there will be grave problems. This policy must not be implemented," his comments were met with short shrift. Sasaki's response was monosyllabic and signified the end of Kure's career.
Thus Kure penned his resignation. He was a wonderful person. In the long history of the Research Department, he is the only one of such calibre.
Three other young members of the Research Department quit along with Kure: Seichiro Saito, Hirohiko Okumura and Seiritsu Ogura. In doing so, no doubt those three were making clear their feelings on that mistaken policy. They were three young men who roused themselves to action by resigning -one had joined the BoJ in 1963 and the other two in 1964. All three went on to become academics. They were of noble spirit.
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Absolutely nothing is outsourced. It's the same in the military. There is a clerk in charge of testing for food poisoning; he eats at 11, and once it is establish that he is none the worse, then the food is distributed to the rest of the workers. If the taster's condition changes, then the food is late. "Oh? What's up today?"… "The food will be a little delayed." And the menu is changed. The assumption is that if all BoJ staffers come down with food poisoning, they won't be able to work and there will be panic in the financial markets. This mindset is quite extraordinary.
At any rate, it is fundamental to BoJ culture to be completely self-sufficient. But the BoJ was criticized by academics for sitting on all that interesting information and not publishing it, so the BoJ decided to pretend that it has adapted to changed circumstances. They couldn't possibly open up the Research Department so they searched for an alternative and decided to create an organization called the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies. By opening this office to external academics, the BoJ could appear as though it was holding a dialogue with the outside world.
The Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies holds conferences in which outsiders are also able to participate, and it undertakes joint research with external academics. However, this office is in the old BoJ building and access to the main building is extremely restricted. Entrance is possible for the purpose of collecting data or visiting the library, but there are instructions not to wander around unnecessarily -a surveillance system of sorts.
Thus, with the establishment of the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, the BoJ began making information public. ….
Werner: But is this information useful?
Ishii: Until then, nothing had been published, so the stance was that it was better than nothing. To be sure, mainly academic papers and conference papers are being published. Those who study abroad and do research thanks to BoJ coffers are writing those papers. If the general public look at those papers, they might assume they have substance, but there is something else going on there.
Books are published quarterly by this Institute and distributed free of charge to banks and universities. Window guidance by the BoJ gets no coverage but interest rates and a wide range of other fields are covered. Looking over the publications, one might feel that the researchers are highly capable, but in reality, before publication, their original work is revised, 'unnecessary' parts are edited out and only what is deemed harmless if made public remains for publication. That continues today.
Werner: So do the economists who work there have an understanding of what information is important?
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Ishii:
The really persistent ones may look into it, but employees in the Banking Department are very busy, they don't have much time to chat, so getting information is probably tough. Maybe you are the only one whom many internal people talked to. If internal staff kept sniffing around as you did, their bosses would no doubt get angry, saying they are being too nosey. Along comes Mr Werner, he's a nice guy, he speaks fluent Japanese, he's not a familiar face to the Banking Department; and they carelessly let their guard down a little and vital information is leaked. You delved into areas that aren't usually broached internally and obtained information that even I didn't know. How surprised they must have been when they saw your book!
On conflicts of interest
Ishii: So we see that the BoJ's information disclosure continues to be something of a sham. The BoJ invites all slightly renowned academics from Europe and the US to Japan and facilitates their activities. The more famous foreign academics are paid $10,000 a month, that's over $100,000 annually just as salary. They live in BoJ-owned housing available to BoJ staff of section chief grade. Fully furnished, naturally. The tab for utility bills is picked up by the BoJ. Obviously the academics pay for their own food, but transport costs are paid for also. Air travel is first class, including for families. At the same time, these academics are receiving salaries from their own universities, so whilst they are working at the BoJ they are able to claim a double salary. What's more, the famous ones can earn money by giving speeches at the Keidanren, Ministry of Finance and others….even more profitable. With such generous treatment, they begin to sing the BoJ's praises. Of course, their shining eyes reflect that the BoJ is a place for them to make money.
The BoJ does not limit this to foreign academics, they use all means with local academics too: gifts of money, bringing them in as advisers, making them members of inquiry commissions etc. They are also paid to give speeches and to train the younger employees. There are any number of academics that the BoJ employ in both Europe, the US and Japan. And these academics are highly unlikely to criticize the BoJ. … As an academic, in order to do research, one needs funding. If they can receive that funding from the BoJ, they won't want to rock the boat. But by the BoJ funding them, they should work faithfully on the BoJ's behalf -it's close to a bribe.
There's an interesting anecdote: about five years ago, the Tax Bureau imposed a tax penalty on the BoJ. According to Japanese income tax laws, money paid to academics by the BoJthat is payment including in the form of furnished housing -falls under the salary bracket. However, the BoJ had never withheld any tax for that [as is legally required]. The Tax Bureau had not noticed until then and had omitted to tax the BoJ. 
III. Some Conclusions and Directions for Further Research
The excerpts from the interview have highlighted a number of issues. One is the topic of central bank independence and the greater accountability which independence calls for. The Bank of Japan became legally independent on 1 April 1998, when the revised Bank of Japan Law became effective. In exchange for independence, the Bank of Japan was obliged to become accountable to the Diet and the public. As Mr Ishii points out, for accountability to be meaningful, the central bank's activities must be transparent. It is not clear that the transparency of the Bank of Japan has increased since 1998. This includes its continued operation and use of the so-called press club system. 19 Leading financial newspapers, such as the Nihon Keizai Shinbun (a.k.a. Nikkei) are still not known for critical analyses of the Bank of Japan's activities. 19 On its role, function and origin, see Werner (2003b) .
The Japanese Economy, vol. 30, no. 6, Nov-Dec 2002 World-wide, central banks have become independent from democratically elected governments and, on occasion, even from democratically elected parliaments (as in the case of the ECB). This increases the importance of accountability and transparency. However, there is no evidence that central banks have actually become more transparent and more accountable in a meaningful sense. Further research is therefore needed into the meaning and actual degree of central bank transparency, accountability and credibility. 20 Clearly, the Bank of Japan and many other central banks, such as the ECB, cannot be considered models of transparency and accountability. This is a problem that policy-makers, including law-makers who can shape incentive structures, should address.
Another topic highlighted by the interview is the potentially problematic relationship between the media and central bankers as well as between economists and central bankers. Further research is needed concerning the ways in which media information may be manipulated by interested parties. Similarly, the question whether economists may be interested parties themselves cannot be avoided.
It has already been noted by many academic economists who have been invited, expenses paid, to central bank research events, that very often the advice given was ignored. In the case of the Bank of Japan, Hamada (2002) notes how leading economists from many countries were invited by the BoJ in 2000 to give their advice on its monetary policy. "It is a pity that [the Bank of Japan] has hardly made use of this advice" (p. 71). This, indeed, raises the question of what the actual purpose of such invitations may be. Milton Friedman, long-standing consultant to central banks concluded after decades of working with the Federal Reserve: "I attended many such meetings of so-called academic consultants. . . . However, I finally concluded that the meetings were called purely for window-dressing purposes. I was unable to detect any influence whatsoever exerted by the consultants' comments on the system's actions. Indeed, the choice of the particular consultants invited to attend seemed designed to guarantee offsetting and contradictory advice, leaving the Fed free to pursue its own devices. However, even on those rare occasions when something approaching a consensus emerged, I could detect no subsequent effect on policy." (Friedman, 1982, p. 105) . Mr Ishii's testimony pointed out that there could be further, equally political motivations for the central bank in paying academics to act as consultants, advisers and presenters. The issue of conflicts of interest in financial markets has received much media attention, especially since the fraud, accounting scandals and illegal activities involving large financial institutions were highlighted by New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer. Spitzer scrutinized and publicly criticized the established practices of many large financial institutions. Today, equity analysts, for instance, announce their personal financial interests when they publish their analyses and recommendations. However, the same is not yet true for economists and academic researchers. Ironically, it is the economists who assume in their models that agents always rationally maximize their own self-interest, even if this 20 For important recent contributions to these issues, see Forder (1998 Forder ( , 2001 Forder ( , 2000 .
The Japanese Economy, vol. 30, no. 6, Nov-Dec 2002 In conclusion, the interview shows that field work should be further expanded and the available human resources in the form of eye-witnesses utilized to a much greater extent in order to increase our understanding of the actual functioning of economic processes -in Japan as much as in any other country.
